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  NOT PRECEDENTIAL  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-3415 
_____________ 
 
EGAN JONES RATINGS COMPANY, 
                                                       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STEVEN PRUETTE; CHRISTOPHER PRUETTE,  
on behalf of Insearch Partners 
____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
No. 2-16-mc-00105 
District Judge: Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 25, 2018 
______________ 
 
 
Before: McKEE, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 13, 2019) 
 
_____ 
 
OPINION* 
_____ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 *  This disposition is not an Opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.  
 
 Appellant (“Egan”) appeals the decision of the District Court denying its petition 
to vacate the final partial arbitration award and granting the plaintiffs’ (“Pruettes”) cross-
petition to confirm.  We will affirm the ruling of the District Court.   
I. 
 On December 20, 1998, Egan, a Nationally Recognized Securities Rating 
Organization, and the Pruettes entered into an integrated contract (“1998 Agreement”) 
granting the Pruettes, through their company InSearch Partners, the exclusive right to sell 
Egan’s reports in exchange for the commissions on sales and the renewal of report 
subscriptions.  When the parties entered into arbitration in February of 2016, the principal 
contractual dispute was whether the 1998 Agreement had expired or been terminated.1  
The termination provision of the contract was as follows: 
The term of this Agreement is two years from the date hereof unless extended 
by mutual agreement.  Either party may end its association with the other 
with 90 days written notice after the end of the two year period, provided, 
however, that if total revenues to [Egan Jones Ratings] from sales made by 
[InSearch Partners], pursuant to this Agreement, exceed $300,000 during the 
last twelve month period of the initial term of this Agreement, then IP will 
have the option to extend the term for a one-year period.  IP will have two 
additional options to renew the Agreement for one additional year each if 
total revenues to EJR exceeds [sic] $450,000 during the third twelve month 
period and $600,000 during the forth [sic] twenty month period after the date 
of this Agreement. . . .   
 
                                              
1 The parties stipulated that the arbitration would be bifurcated into liability and damages 
phases.  The issue on appeal before this Court involves the arbitration decision on 
liability only; a separate arbitration hearing is to be held on damages.  
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App. 53.  Through 2003, the Pruettes’ sales exceeded the requisite thresholds and the 
contract continued intact.  During 2004 and 2014, the parties exchanged numerous 
contract revision proposals, but never settled upon a replacement agreement.  Throughout 
that time period, the Pruettes continued to perform their contractual duties until sometime 
in 2014, when Egan breached the 1998 Agreement by hiring another salesman to sell the 
reports in violation of the contract’s exclusivity provision, and stopped making 
commission payments to the Pruettes.   
 On March 21, 2016, after conducting two days of hearings in February of 2016, 
the arbitrator found that the term of the 1998 Agreement was indefinite, that no new 
written agreement had been executed, and that Egan gave no notice of termination before 
breaching the contract in 2014.  In making this finding, the arbitrator found that there was 
no credible evidence the Pruettes received Egan’s putative notice of termination, 
allegedly dated May 10, 2006.  Egan petitioned the District Court under the Federal 
Arbitration Act [“FAA”], 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., to vacate the final partial arbitration 
award, which the District Court denied.   
 On appeal, Egan argues the District Court erred in concluding that the arbitrator 
acted competently and did not manifestly disregard the law (1) by not addressing the 
statute of limitations defense, (2) by interpreting the 1998 Agreement to be perpetual 
unless affirmatively terminated by one of the parties, and (3) by finding the Agreement 
was in effect until terminated by Egan in 2014.  We disagree for the following reasons.  
II. 
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 Review of arbitration awarded under the FAA is “extremely deferential.” 
Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d 574, 578 (3d Cir. 
2005) (quoting Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003)).  Vacatur is 
appropriate only in “‘exceedingly narrow’ circumstances, such as where arbitrators are 
partial or corrupt, or where the arbitration panel manifestly disregards, rather than merely 
erroneously interprets, the law.”  Id. (citing Strasberg, 321 F.3d at 370).  When an 
arbitrator’s task is to interpret the clauses of the agreement, “a reviewing court may only 
determine whether the arbitrator’s award was totally unsupported by principles of 
contract construction.” Acro Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 
1982) (internal citations omitted).   
Furthermore, “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that findings of fact and 
inferences to be drawn therefrom are the exclusive province of the arbitrator.” Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seaman's Union (“Exxon III”), 73 F.3d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir.1996) 
(citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)).  “When 
an arbitrator resolves disputes regarding the application of a contract, and no dishonesty 
is alleged, the arbitrator's ‘improvident, even silly, factfinding’ does not provide a basis 
for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award.” Major League Baseball Players 
Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. 
Misco, 484 U.S. at 39).  It is not proper for a reviewing court to “reexamine the evidence” 
when reviewing an arbitration award, and errors in factfinding do not justify reversal.  
Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reins Co., Ltd, 868 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 
1989); accord Misco, 484 U.S. at 36-38.   
   
 
5 
 
III. 
With regard to Egan’s contention that the arbitrator erred by not ruling on the 
statute of limitations defense, we find that the arbitrator’s predicate findings rendered 
such a determination irrelevant.  The arbitrator interpreted the 1998 Agreement to 
continue beyond the initial period of two years and up until either party provided a “90 
day written notice” of its intention to withdraw.  App. 196.  This interpretation of the 
termination provision falls within the bounds of the principles of contract construction 
and therefore must be upheld by this Court.  See NF&M Corp. v. United Steelworkers of 
Am., 524 F.2d 756, 759 (3d Cir.1975) (quoting Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 
F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir.1969)) (only where there is a “manifest disregard of the 
agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract construction and the law of the 
shop, may a reviewing court disturb the award.”)  The arbitrator found that, although 
Egan had the right to do so earlier, it did not provide the requisite notice until 2014.  The 
Pruettes filed their demand for arbitration on February 6, 2015, well within the 
Pennsylvania statute of limitations period of four years for commencing a proceeding for 
breach of contract.  Rather than manifestly disregarding governing Pennsylvania law, the 
arbitrator made factual findings that deemed the statute of limitations defense 
inapplicable.  Egan’s argument that an arbitrator must explicitly reject every potential 
defense, even if it is rendered moot by his own factual findings, is both practically and 
legally untenable. 
Egan next contests the arbitrator’s factual findings.  In reaching the conclusion 
that Egan breached the 1998 Agreement in 2014, the arbitrator found no “credible 
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evidence” that the Pruettes ever received a prior notice of termination.  App. 196.  
Despite being not required to do so, the arbitrator supported his factual findings by citing 
testimony from both parties given at the February 2016 arbitration hearings.  That it 
believed the Pruettes’ testimony over Egan’s version of events does not present grounds 
for relief.  A reviewing court “is precluded from overturning an award for errors in 
assessing the credibility of witnesses, in the weight accorded their testimony, or in the 
determination of factual issues.” NF&M Corp., 524 F.2d at 759 (citing Amalgamated 
Butchers, Local 641 v. Capitol Packing Co., 413 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1969), and Dallas 
Typographical Union, No. 173 v. A.H. Belo Corp., 372 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1967)).  After 
reviewing the record, we agree with the District Court that the arbitrator’s findings were 
the result of a “proper weighing of conflicting evidence” and no justifiable grounds for 
vacating the partial final award exist.  App. 16. 
Egan next asserts that the arbitrator’s finding that the contract was in effect until 
2014 was in contravention of public policy, which discourages contracts that exist in 
perpetuity.  But a contract that is ongoing until it is terminated by either party is not one 
of indefinite duration.  The arbitrator interpreted the contract’s plain language to 
encompass a means of termination, i.e., that either party can permissibly withdraw after 
providing a 90-day written notice.  Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that 
public policy concerns regarding a contract of indefinite duration do not apply here.  
Again, because the arbitrator’s interpretation of the termination provision’s plain 
language, at the very least, “‘draws its essence’ from or ‘arguably construes or applies’ 
the parties’ contract,” it must withstand our review on appeal.  Metromedia Energy, 409 
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F.3d at 584 (quoting News Am. Pub. v. Newark Typographical Union, 918 F.2d 21, 24 
(3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original)).   
Since we have found all of Egan’s contentions to be without merit, we affirm the 
District Court’s decision to deny its petition to vacate the partial final award of the 
arbitration.  The case is hereby returned to arbitration so that damages can be assessed. 
